The Ecological Necessity of Confronting the Problem of Human Overpopulation

In his article “The Ecological Necessity of Confronting the Problem of Human Overpopulation” Garrett Hardin takes an essentially economic standpoint in assessing population. He critiques Jeremy Bentham’s idea of striving for ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ yet retains utilitarianism conception of maximizing pleasures and minimizing pains. He uses this framework to explain how economic incentives can be used to assess situations of commonly owned property. The story of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ shows us that when property is not owned individually (or at least not privatized) each person using the land has an incentive to use too much of it because his costs are divided up between everyone who is using the land. He reaps all the benefits and yet suffers only a fraction of the losses.

Hardin then goes on to argue that the tragedy of the commons can inform the way we think about carrying capacity. Carrying capacity is “the maximum number of a species that can be supported indefinitely by a particular habitat, allowing for seasonal and random changes, without degradation of the environment and without diminishing carrying capacity in the future” (438). Hardin argues that how we treat the environment, animal populations, and ultimately human populations should be a function of the carrying capacity. He argues that through technology we can increase the world’s carrying capacity, but ultimately we, as a species, are going to have to take some serious steps to controlling our population.

While I agree that overpopulation is an extremely pertinent and difficult question, I believe that Hardin fundamentally is approaching the problem in the wrong way. He opts for an essentially technological solution to a technological problem. While he does include ‘knowledge’ as a part of his solution, the knowledge he advocates for is knowledge concerning contraceptives. Instead of knowledge, I would argue people need to better understand the problem. A well rounded education will do much more good than knowing how to use a condom. Perhaps at the heart of my critique of Hardin’s approach to the problem is that he sees human beings as things or objects instead of people. He says things like “the child who is saved today becomes a breeder tomorrow” and argues that dropping atomic bombs would be better than food: “for a few moments the misery would be acute, but it would soon come to an end for most of the people, leaving a very few survivors to suffer thereafter.” He denies the validity of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Hardin ends with this statement: “A country that gives food to other countries must also insist on evidence of responsible actions. Only by such insistence can the donor nation make sure that the next generation in the recipient nation has a chance at a decent life. Making these tough conditions is the kindest thing we can do for the needy peoples of the world. And ultimately for the whole world” (442). While I am all for oversight, this statement is naively patronizing at best, and violently hubristic at worst. It assumes that we ‘the rich’ know what is best for them ‘the poor’ and that we could and should make decisions for others because they are not are not capable of making them for themselves. Overall, I find that Hardin’s approach to be deeply troubling. In his attempt to secure a ‘better life’ he sacrifices the most important aspect of human society: the ability to be treated as a full and robust human being.