Tom Regan begins his article Animals as Subjects-of-a-Life by saying that he is an advocate of animal rights. He argues that the wrong being done to animals is a function of the entire system. While details may be more heart wrenching, we need to address how we conceive of animals on the whole. Regan addresses three accounts that he argues ultimately fail to provide an adequate understanding of morality with respect to animals. He first looks at the ‘Kantian account,’ which says that one has an obligation to animals not for their own sake, but because if one treats animals poorly, one is more likely to treat humans poorly. Regan dismisses this as speciesism. He then looks at the ‘cruelty account,’ which says that an act is immoral if it is cruel; that is to say, if the actor takes pleasure from the pain of another individual. Regan dismisses this because it relies on the mental states of the agents. Lastly, he looks at the ‘utilitarian account,’ which he says advocates two principles: that desires are equal regardless of the individual that has them and that the greatest good (satisfying the most desires) for the greatest number should be promoted. Regan dismisses this because it can lead to speciesism if certain individuals (namely animals) are not considered in the moral calculus.
After rejecting these three accounts, Regan argues for an ‘animal rights’ account. This account advocates that “the rights of the individual trump the goals of the group,” except if one has “very good reason” to believe that violating a right will prevent a “vastly greater harm” (165). (Although he doesn’t articulate what these ‘good reasons’ are or what constitutes a ‘vastly greater’ in reference to harm). Regan grounds his animal rights theory in the Kantian notion that individuals have a kind of inherent value. He argues that this inherent value comes not from being an end in itself, but from having a life (as opposed to merely being alive). It is not clear exactly what this distinction entails, but Regan argues that disallows prejudices on the basis of species. If humans have rights, he argues, then animals have rights too.
Ben, you do a great job picking out the main themes and ideas of the author's argument. I'm just really surprised that you don't have an opinion to go along with this one. What do you think about it?
ReplyDeleteI'm not quite sure if I buy what he is saying about animal rights. Regan's argument that grants animals inherent value is rather quick and vague. Also, his account for animal rights (while being duty based) seems very similar to his account of utilitarianism. The rights he argues for only apply to the individual in certain situations. Regan doesn't define what these situations are. It seems like the rights of the individual can be disregarded as long as it is serving the 'greater good'.
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