Monday, October 31, 2011
Louis CK on technology
http://comedians.jokes.com/louis-c-k-/videos/uncensored---louis-c-k----the-miracle-of-flight/
technology reading
Friday, October 28, 2011
Charlie Russell on Treadwell and "Grizzly Man"
Here's the link to Charlie Russell's reflections on the life of Tim Treadwell, and its depiction in Herzog's film. Though I think it's important not to conflate two very different lives, I think that Russell offers us a glimpse of what a project like Treadwell's might look like if liberated from the dark side of his personality, and from the (arguable) distortion of the documentarian's lens.
Wednesday, October 26, 2011
The Grizzley Man
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
Video- akin to Food Inc. but with a religious spin
Ethical Cannibalism
On The Uncanny Goodness of Being Edible to Bears
Sunday, October 23, 2011
Soybeans over Cattle?
I found that these facts made me want to agree with Singer that vegans are better for the environment. However, I wonder how the environment would look if cattle were not eaten but soybeans and grains dominated the landscape. I feel that we would still be using water at a rate which is too quick for aquifers to be restored and stream and lakes to be restored. Additionally, if soy consumption were to increase, clearing of the rainforests would not decrease. I imagine that it would stay level, but instead of being shipped off as grain feed, it would be shipped away as vegetarian burger patties. Also, agriculture, no mater what the crop or animal, always creates poor soil and pollution. However, one fact brought up by Singer is the death of thousands of coyotes by ranchers trying to protect tehir livestock. I feel that coyotes would more less likely to be killed or maimed if the ranchers were protecting soybean harvests since I seriously doubt soybean is a favorite food for coyotes.
Therefore, I'm not sure I can agree with Singer. I feel that the agriculture production needed to be a vegan, no animal products whatsoever, would have its toll on the environment. Thre are so many products that come from meat, but I like the idea of over 6 thousand not dead or tortured coyotes. Also, it would be great if I produced 1.5 tons less CO2 than I do now. However, I feel that Singer's ethical argument against animals may work better than the envornmental argument because we do not know what the environmental effects would be if meat consumption was non existent.
Thoughts on "The Cove"
Last Wednesday the philosophy film series showed “The Cove”: A film about the practice of dolphin hunting off the coast of Thaiji Japan. I didn’t get a chance to view the film at he screening with the rest of you guys, so I watched it over fall break and decided to air my thoughts on the blog.
What caught my attention was not that Ric O’Barry advocated for the rights of the dolphin to be protected, and thus guard against hunting them. Instead, what caught my attention was the argument Barry uses to defend his position that dolphins should be protected under the Whaling commission’s regulations. Barry says that the first event which caused him to question the way in which dolphins were treated in captivity was on the set of “Flipper”: the T.V. series. While Barry was training one of the dolphins that played the part of flipper, Barry says that the dolphin knowingly and consciously chose to stop its own breathing, resulting in the dolphins death. Barry claims the dolphin, “committed suicide”.
Barry claims that it was at this moment of watching this dolphin lose its life as a result of it being depressed. This depression Barry claims was a result of living in captivity for several years. Barry argues that dolphins are, like humans, “social creatures” and that they have very complex ways of communicating. Barry says that the sonar calls which dolphins use to communicate with one another is more complex than we humans can imagine. This leads Barry to the conclusion that dolphins are “smart”.
We have seen before in thinkers like Aristotle and Beacon that the ability to communicate is something that separates the humans from the animals. Other criteria like reason, and intelligence have also been classically identified as the standard for a being to be recognized as morally considerable. This is where Barry’s argument that dolphins should be protected because of their intelligence loses its footing.
While I don’t wish to condemn Barry for advocating for dolphin rights, I don’t think any person would except for maybe the fishermen of Thaiji, it bothers me that his argument is a thin veil hiding a speciesist attitude. If Barry wishes to extend moral considerability to dolphins on the basis of their intelligence, Barry must also concede, which I don’t think he would be happy doing, that there are plenty of animals which aren’t intelligence, but are being poached every day, and in greater numbers than dolphins. If human-like intelligence is the basis for Barry’s claim that dolphins should be equally morally considerable to humans, he must also consent that those animals without signs of human intelligence are not morally considerable, or change the basis for his advication for dolphin rights.
Egg Carton Labels
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/confinement_farm/facts/guide_egg_labels.html
Thursday, October 20, 2011
Food, Inc. and the Conscientious Omnivore
We discussed how dumpster divers have essentially “opted out” of the entire system by eating the waste that would be there either way. When it comes to the meat industry, Vegans and Vegetarians (for the most part) have essentially opted out as well, along with responsible hunters who get their meat by their own means. The meat industry would obviously not be interested in serving their needs and listening to their preferences since they have no financial interest to do so. The only relevant groups to the multinational meat producers, then, are factory farm omnivores and conscientious omnivores.
The large mega-slaughterhouses that were displayed in the film not only create more hazards to the consumer (i.e., an increased risk of E. Coli) but also inflict upon the animals substantial pains both in their lives and their deaths. The film also showed an alternative to these slaughterhouses in the farmer guy wearing a goofy hat whose farm was substantially more humane and still economically viable. The animals raised and slaughtered under those circumstances were also shown to be healthier for the consumer. The brief section of the film on the growing organic branch of the food industry clearly showed that the large food companies are only as tied to certain practices as they are to the profits those practices produce, as corporations like Wal-Mart were jumping onto the organic bandwagon with both feet. If conscientious omnivores become numerous and vociferous enough to make changing the method of raising and slaughtering animals economically appealing, the same large meat companies that treat animals so deplorably now will change those practices and laugh all the way to the bank. How is that transformation going to happen? Probably very slowly, with media like Food, Inc., which exposes those current practices that the large meat companies take great pains to hide.
The only important things to measure in the utilitarian calculus are pleasures and pains that an action causes. While vegans, vegetarians, responsible hunters, and dumpster divers are all well and good, the vast majority of Americans, the factory farm omnivores, have little interest in converting to any of those. The chance for a good amount of them to become conscientious omnivores, however, seems entirely feasible. That conversion on a large scale, I think, would be the best way to reduce a large amount of pain while increasing pleasure as well, not only for the animals, but also for us.
Wednesday, October 19, 2011
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Arne Naess, "The Shallow and Deep Ecology Movement" : Saving the World in Seven Points
1. A systemic orientation, whereby systems (such as the biosphere) must be thought of as greater than the sum of their parts, rather than in terms of individual entities which ostensibly compose them.
2. Biospheric egalitarianism: a total rejection of anthropocentrism in principle, even if implementation of this ethic must progress in stages which contain vestiges of "exploitation and repression".
3. Principles of diversity and symbiosis; that is, that diversity in both the non-human and human spehres (in terms of cultures, traditions, economies, etc.) as well as a "live-and-let live" ethic are guiding principles.
4. Anti-class posture: as a consequence of this preference for diversity and cooperation over competition, dominating social structures by any group over another are reprobated.
5. Combating resource depletion and pollution: This point is fairly obvious, but Naess is keen to emphasize that it should not be taken in isolation from the others (such would be "shallow" ecology).
6. Complexity, not complication: This point is part epistemelogical and part practical, emphasizing the limits of human knowledge in regard to complex systems such as the natural world and an "elastic" approach to problem-solving, which Naess argues would combine conservative and radical principles in its political approach.
7. Local autonomy and decentralization: The value of diversity as well as the negative ecological effects of globalization entail a preference for local decision making and self-government.
Some questions for Naess' ecological program arise from the tension between this preference for decentralization and the seeming need for centralized power to effect some of the other sweeping changes he advocates; Naess notes this apparent contradiction but does not fully attempt to reconcile these positions. More broadly, the platform of the Deep Ecology movement stands for changes with "consequences for all aspects of human life"; one wonders as to the prospects for such a movement, given that they aim to change the material conditions of human existence in a manner that has not been accomplished since the Industrial Revolution: and that development was not a directed, normatively-driven shift.
The question then, is of the moral and political merits of this prospective Deep Ecological Revolution, and perhaps whether it stands to gain any traction in the world as we find it.
Andrew McLaughlin's "The Heart of Deep Ecology"
1.) human and non-human life is important. It has value apart from the way it can be used by humans.
2.) Life forms are different, but we should cherish the diversity not see some forms of life as higher or lower than others.
3.)Humans have no right to be excessive in their use of diverse natural beings. We must use nature to sustain ourselves, but we must not indulge in wants and consumerism.
4.) A gradual depopulation of people will save cultures and make lives better. As it is now, the lives of many people are not fully satisfied because there are not enough resources for everyone.
5.) humans excessively interfere with the non-human world: if we stop doing this we can even help save diverse indigenous cultures that can live off the lands we destroy sustainably.
6.)policies must change: what exactly should be sustained? We must sustain the diversity of life form.
7.)We need to appreciate life quality rather than always wanting a greater standard of living. in this way, humans will be happier.
8.)We have either an indirect or direct duty to make the changes necessary to implement the other 7 claims.
I personally think that I like this "deep ecology" platform because it shows that there are greater social implications to why we need to stop pollution and why we need to not clearcut forests. I do have some questions about the movement.
1.) McLaughlin talks about how if we save wilderness from industry we can in fact be saving diverse indigenous cultures. While I do not thin kits wrong to save these places or these people I'm not sure about whether or not McLaughlin is discrediting his and our unique culture. He talks abut how important this diversity is and I'm not sure he gives enough credit to how diverse a people we are apart from indigenous cultures.
2.) On a similar note, McLaughlin is solely thinking about saving these indigenous cultures from "us" the big bad people who are ruining the planet and all its diversity. He does not think about what these cultures may want. His view is from our perspective and we have no way of knowing what is best for these cultures or if they want to exist completely separate from us.
I think McLaughlin gets a lot of things right especially when he talks about how we must appreciate our life and appreciate the quality of the things we have and not always want a constant replacement of consumer goods. His idea about the population being far too large is pretty spot on but I cannot fathom enough social change to happen to stop population from growing and rather decrease.
Sunday, October 9, 2011
Biotic ethics
Did our ethics come from God (or gods)? Callicott says that can't be right because scientific principle states that such supernatural explanations (like religion) can hold no water with regards to natural phenomena.
Hume and Adam Smith believe that our ethics came from our animal feelings and sentiments.
Darwin argues that the tight bonds that families have with their kin spread throughout larger populations, giving rise to such ethical feelings. Callicott goes further, quoting Darwin: "the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts" (203).
Callicott proposes ecological thought, which also involves an individual's relationship with the whole (in this case, the whole environment).
So ethics and society or community are correlative.
But it is also true, according to Callicott, that ecological relationships determine the nature of organisms, not the other way around (207).
The whole ends up shaping the parts that make it up. So, the very soil, solar energy, food chains and death and decay are part of this biotic whole. We are in there right along with everything else, and I agree that there is a certain level of respect that goes along with being a part of this whole. It is not as if we will no longer be a part of the whole if our laziness and neglect of consequences of our actions will get us kicked out. We will be in in no matter what, so we best continue thinking how we affect the whole, because this whole represents us as well.
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
For those of us who care for our animal friends-
For every click, sponsors donate money to help feed and care for animals currently in shelters. =]
Bias, A Dish Best Served Hot
In Singers article, “All Animals Are Equal”, singer argues that humanity as a whole is guilty of discriminating against nonhuman animals. Singer calls humans that discriminate against animals in this way: Specialists. Singer’s argument is that if one views the treatment of animals in accordance with the way that humans have been discriminated against throughout history, one will see that the plight of the nonhuman animal is very similar to minority humans.
Singer recounts the black liberation movement, and the women’s rights movements as two prime examples of minority groups that have demanded the same rights as their white male counterparts. The striking parallel that is drawn in this essay is not merely the parallel between these movements and the avocation for animal rights, but instead how blacks, women, and Native Americans all were portrayed as animals before they received their position as equals among white males. Singer notes that, like animals, these groups were seen as commodities that only served the end of the majority. Women were seen as concubines for child bearing before they received equal rights as males. Both Africans and Native Americans were used purely for their labor, and could be held as property into the nineteenth century. All of these groups were before they achieved equal rights, like animals are today, only a resource for human ends.
This way of thinking about animals as a product is something that Singer argues is a consequence of our bias towards them and nothing more. This bias first and foremost is formed in the way that we interact with animals. Singer notes that for most of the human population we only interact directly with animals at the dinner table, or we interact with them indirectly when we purchase products, which have been tested on animals. Both of these examples color the lenses through which we understand and interact with animals. These lenses are the bias, which Singer refers to, and it is a viewpoint that we need to adjust in order to talk about the issue of animal rights.
Singers next move is to present a couple of thought exponents. Singer claims that one common justification for using animals as test subjects in experiments is that using them ultimately spares thousands of human lives. Singers counter argument to this is the following: what if by using an orphaned human infant for chemical-testing thousands of human lives could be saved? This example may seem farfetched but Singer is able to show why it is not. Singer points out that nearly any line we may draw in an attempt to divide moral obligations to human and moral obligations to animals is not clear-cut. If we use reason as our basis it is easy to find humans that lack reason. If it is that humans are purposeful, it is also clear that animals have a natural purpose. While it is clear that we are “different” from animals to me, it is not easy to say exactly how we owe or don’t owe the same moral consideration to them as we do to our own species.
It is clear after reading singers article that I too am bias towards my own species. If I were forced to choose between a person’s life and an animal’s life I would most certainly choose the person. Singer’s argument revolves around and irritates this bias that I have, and I think I am safe in saying we all share. But, the difference that I see in myself and singer is that I am ok with that bias. I do not think that I am justified in choosing the life of an animal over the life of a fellow human, but I feel completely at ease with that choice nonetheless. It may not be morally right, but I do not think we owe the same moral considerations to animals that we do to other people. Besides, animals taste too good not to eat anyway.
No one is equal.
However, I would argue with this point and say that we do not view ourselves equally as a species. There are many instances in society where we undervalue the needs of others because we feel they are subordinate. I do not believe Singer can accurately suggest humanity believes in equality among our own society, because we are all self-interested and do not necessarily consider the needs and interests of others at all. We hold are selves higher than any other. Therefore, when animals promote our own well-being, humans are also likely to view their needs more important than a fellow human's who we feel to be less important than our selves.
Although, I personally do believe that animals should be considered in the actions we daily take, I am not convinced this can be done through Singer's idea of spreading equality to species outside of our own. I think we already do this, in so long as it benefits our individual good. I think the solution still lies in detoxing humans of their anthropocentric views, in order for any advances at all to be made in respecting animals and other humans for that matter.
Sunday, October 2, 2011
Animals as Subjects-of-a-Life
Tom Regan begins his article Animals as Subjects-of-a-Life by saying that he is an advocate of animal rights. He argues that the wrong being done to animals is a function of the entire system. While details may be more heart wrenching, we need to address how we conceive of animals on the whole. Regan addresses three accounts that he argues ultimately fail to provide an adequate understanding of morality with respect to animals. He first looks at the ‘Kantian account,’ which says that one has an obligation to animals not for their own sake, but because if one treats animals poorly, one is more likely to treat humans poorly. Regan dismisses this as speciesism. He then looks at the ‘cruelty account,’ which says that an act is immoral if it is cruel; that is to say, if the actor takes pleasure from the pain of another individual. Regan dismisses this because it relies on the mental states of the agents. Lastly, he looks at the ‘utilitarian account,’ which he says advocates two principles: that desires are equal regardless of the individual that has them and that the greatest good (satisfying the most desires) for the greatest number should be promoted. Regan dismisses this because it can lead to speciesism if certain individuals (namely animals) are not considered in the moral calculus.
After rejecting these three accounts, Regan argues for an ‘animal rights’ account. This account advocates that “the rights of the individual trump the goals of the group,” except if one has “very good reason” to believe that violating a right will prevent a “vastly greater harm” (165). (Although he doesn’t articulate what these ‘good reasons’ are or what constitutes a ‘vastly greater’ in reference to harm). Regan grounds his animal rights theory in the Kantian notion that individuals have a kind of inherent value. He argues that this inherent value comes not from being an end in itself, but from having a life (as opposed to merely being alive). It is not clear exactly what this distinction entails, but Regan argues that disallows prejudices on the basis of species. If humans have rights, he argues, then animals have rights too.