what about when people walk their dogs and after the dog poops, the owner thoughtfully leaves it on the sidewalk for someone else to step in. The owner clearly cares about the dog, otherwise they would not have been walking it. But they don't give a rat's ass as to who's gonna step in it once there dog has relieved itself. They are arguably being indirectly morally obligated to humans by walking the dog and therefore caring about its well being, but I think that it directly harming people who don't want to walk in waste every time they're walking down the sidewalk.

Kant's "Critique of Teleological Judgment"

Here's Betsy's post on Kant:

Once again I was assigned a long, confusing article, but I will try and summarize Kant’s points concisely and correctly. The ultimate end of his argument in Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment is to prove that there is a God. This is revealed at the end of the article, so I’ll go through the points that lead up to this conclusion. In the first section, Kant describes natural ends. A natural end is a thing that “exists as a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself”. He gives an example of a tree and how it is its own means to an end or cause and effect. Its species continually regenerates from its own kind; the individual generates or grows from its own material which cannot be provided from an outside source; and even its smallest parts, such as a leaf, depend on the whole and the whole upon the tiny leaf. The tree cannot create energy without its leaves and the leaves cannot exist on their own, so it is a product and an end.

Now that Kant has established what natural ends are, he goes on to explain how they are organized beings. He contrasts key terms in this section, efficient causes and final causes. The first is real causation, or what we think of cause and effect literally. An example would be dominoes hitting each other and creating a chain reaction. The key to this idea is that it only works one way; once the dominoes fall they do not cause the reverse reaction. The second, final causes, is a more ideal, theoretical causation. This connection requires the use of concepts to see how the causation goes in a circle and does not work solely one way. Again he emphasizes that a natural end must produce itself and from its parts that only exist for the sake of the whole.

Next he describes the difference between machine and an organized being. An organized being has capability beyond simple movement, it has “formative power” to organize itself and exist apart from outside causes. At the end of this section Kant seems to undo all he has been arguing by stating that no analogy is appropriate to describe the “inner natural perfection” of organized beings. By saying this, he argues that his own previous analogies are not adequate and cannot explain his argument fully.

Kant’s final point is that we cannot conceive the world or concept without admitting to a being that intentionally started the whole cycle and acted as the “supreme cause”. The last statement seems contradictory because Kant is arguing that we cannot judge if a greater being acts as a catalyst for the world’s processes. In the same sentence he follows with the statement , “we absolutely cannot base the possibility of those natural ends on anything except an intelligent being” (271). My question is what conclusion does Kant ultimately make on this issue? Is he actually trying to prove there is a greater being, namely God, or does he refute this claim by saying it is past our comprehension?

duty

I got beat to the "old yeller" defense so I'm at a bit of a loss....but consider: from the infamous cat-ladies, to whale people (as mentioned by Colin), to Steve Irwin, to all the kids in disney movies with their golden retrievers - human camaraderie with and duty to animals on, or very near, an intrahuman level is not that unheard of; there's a bunch of people that like their animals way more than people. This would suggest self duty is completely self centered (me valuing anything/anyone only because of the way they make me feel) or external duties stretch as far as partial emotional identification will allow (I don't like the feeling of pain, I have a duty to prevent the same feeling from existing in something else; tree-mourning hippies from the video being on the further end).

Turtle, Turtle!

So following Colin M.'s post, there are many people that are dedicated to animals and are continuously working towards making the animals' lives better. They don't just recycle or cut the loops on the plastic coke holders. An example would be like the Sea Turtle Conservancy, which is a large non-profit. Also, many people volunteer (and pay) to go and help sea turtles. These ecovolunteers don't have to pay money to tag sea turtles in Costa Rica, they could very well choose to just sit on a beach and drink margaritas.

My example = All the time!

The difference between a moral duty to oneself and a moral duty to an animal always makes a difference when it comes to practical application. We all breach duties on a regular basis, those to ourselves as well as to others. When it comes to evaluating our actions and intentions, the source of our duties has a huge influence. For example, if I intend to kill a goat with a claw hammer for sheer amusement, I probably won't care all that much about having a moral duty to myself not to do so. But if I recognize that I have a moral duty to the goat itself, I imagine that that would affect my actions considerably, probably resulting in my refraining from killing that goat. By evaluating the pleasure and pain caused by the act, both those of myself and the goat (thoroughly turning this analysis from deontological to utilitarian in the process) it seems clear that the better course of action would be sparing the goat's life.

Moral considerablility is not exclusive to moral agents

I am 100% behind the idea that other animals do not have moral responsibilities to us or to each other, yet I dont believe that this ability to be held responsible is the only determining factor in moral considerability. As I said Monday, moral judgements are making a claim of what is 'good' or 'bad' and I think that Nature definitely should be considered morally! If we eradicate a species from the planet, to me this is a bad thing! A morally wrong thing! Especially if it is not in direct relation to the protection of our own species (which I acknowledge must be our first concern, as we are indeed members of our own species). Thus I think that in the case of extinction, (as we are the only creatures known to cause this) we should be held morally responsible toward nature.

Tastier when treated better

This post is not to say that we should focus on feeding chickens and cattle healthy diets so that they end up tasting good to us when we eat. However, it is true that the meat from these animals tastes better and has better nutritional quality when their diets consist of fresh grass and insects, rather than corn-feed pumped with nasty chemicals that cause harm to the animals whose digestive tracts can't handle it anyway. Cows and chickens that are kept in solitude, being fed this unhealthy diet of corn are suffering. AND their meat is less healthy. If humans create a healthy lifestyle for animals we intend to eat, they will be more nutritional for us, and there is little suffering.

My point is, we both benefit.