Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Sacrificing one for the other.
I was trying to think of an example to post, and was honestly having a very hard time. However, I did find one interesting observation. Where can we say the duty lies when we feed our pets (such as a snake) live animals? You may be able to argue feeding your pet snake keeps it alive which it turn makes you, the human, happy, thus reflects another indirect duty. However, does this not create some hierarchy among animals; giving your pet snake more value than the mouse you are feeding it? I think this then means that we show direct duty to the snake in which we recognize our duty to sacrifice the mouse for the snake, because the snake is inherently more intelligent or valuable. This could be a stretch to view this scenario as a direct duty towards animals, but regardless I still think the way humans place animals in hierarchies and our reasoning behind this is an interesting debate.
Whale Wars
So before I even get to the gist of my example, I realize it's farfetched now but will explain as I go.
I think that the group of people responsible for the original idea behind what ultimately ended up being documented and made into a TV show--the Discovery show Whale Wars--served a sense of duty to the environment and nature. I understand that once it became a hit TV series, the Sea Shepard crew began to fulfill a duty to the environment as a self-duty to promote ratings, gain fame, gain popularity and support...but the original concept where people put their very lives at stake for the betterment of animals in which they received nothing from--that is selfless. While people could argue that they received 'good feelings' or positive responses from others, I propose that the sheer misery that must be involved with such a 'job' would outweigh any benefits received. Ultimately, i think they were serving a moral duty to nature, the environment and 'the other'.
Regarding Duties to Critters
I found it surprisingly difficult to identify a particular moral claim in relation to the environment (or animals in particular)that cannot be justified in terms of either indirect or direct duties, since assenting to either course does not in of itself specify what those duties are.
Take eating animals. One could take the view that animals are worthy of moral-considerability in of themselves, and therefore we ought not to destroy them or cause them pain, and hence eating meat is unjustified. Equally, one could argue in favor of vegetarianism on the basis that destruction of animal life is unjustified because it is not necessary (since we can arguably satisfy our nutritional needs from other sources) and because the destructiveness that characterizes killing other creatures is harmful to our moral sensibility in our dealings with other humans. Likewise, the reverse position (that it's acceptable to eat animals) can be justified by arguing either that we have no direct duties to animals (and, furthermore that indirect duties are superseded by direct benefits to humans), or that such direct duties as may exist but nonetheless be secondary to concern for humans in a given situation.
Hence, the bare assertion or denial of direct duties to animals does not necessarily imply any particular set of moral judgements as to individual actions. Nonetheless, in reality one would expect the adherents of these positions to often reach different conclusions, with perhaps the major difference being that since the notion of indirect duties to animals is part of a moral system with humans (as the only moral agents) as its end-all and be-all, proponents of this idea would be more likely to assent to actions which promote the tangible well-being of humans at the expense of animals. In other words, in this ethical system, it may be immoral to wantonly destroy natural life (such behavior being degrading to humanity), but the use of natural life for legitimate human purposes is morally unimpeachable (animals and other nonhuman life being means rather than ends, in Kantian terms). The mourning hippies from Colin's video would take another view, of course, and one can safely assume that they adhere to the idea of direct moral duties to the natural world.
One can assert therefore that these two positions regarding duties towards nature are not ethical straitjackets, but their basic outlook does incline their proponents towards positions more or less balanced towards the interests of humanity (in the case of the Kantian, indirect-duty paradigm) or towards non-human nature (in the case of the partisans of direct duties).
Take eating animals. One could take the view that animals are worthy of moral-considerability in of themselves, and therefore we ought not to destroy them or cause them pain, and hence eating meat is unjustified. Equally, one could argue in favor of vegetarianism on the basis that destruction of animal life is unjustified because it is not necessary (since we can arguably satisfy our nutritional needs from other sources) and because the destructiveness that characterizes killing other creatures is harmful to our moral sensibility in our dealings with other humans. Likewise, the reverse position (that it's acceptable to eat animals) can be justified by arguing either that we have no direct duties to animals (and, furthermore that indirect duties are superseded by direct benefits to humans), or that such direct duties as may exist but nonetheless be secondary to concern for humans in a given situation.
Hence, the bare assertion or denial of direct duties to animals does not necessarily imply any particular set of moral judgements as to individual actions. Nonetheless, in reality one would expect the adherents of these positions to often reach different conclusions, with perhaps the major difference being that since the notion of indirect duties to animals is part of a moral system with humans (as the only moral agents) as its end-all and be-all, proponents of this idea would be more likely to assent to actions which promote the tangible well-being of humans at the expense of animals. In other words, in this ethical system, it may be immoral to wantonly destroy natural life (such behavior being degrading to humanity), but the use of natural life for legitimate human purposes is morally unimpeachable (animals and other nonhuman life being means rather than ends, in Kantian terms). The mourning hippies from Colin's video would take another view, of course, and one can safely assume that they adhere to the idea of direct moral duties to the natural world.
One can assert therefore that these two positions regarding duties towards nature are not ethical straitjackets, but their basic outlook does incline their proponents towards positions more or less balanced towards the interests of humanity (in the case of the Kantian, indirect-duty paradigm) or towards non-human nature (in the case of the partisans of direct duties).
What furry friend are you wearing?
Recently, the Western Hollywood Government banned the sale of Furs. The argument: it is unethical to bring harm upon animals for the purpose of entertainment. This legislation is purely symbolic though. Anyone who wishes to buy a fur can easily go a town over for their purchase.
Monday, September 26, 2011
Direct duty to animals
I'm not going to lie, I'm pretty proud of this example =]
Putting an animal "down"- how is this not a direct duty to the animal itself? How does the human stand to gain by this action? Don't we even commonly describe it as "putting the animal out of its misery" which interestingly brings up the notion that animals do suffer and feel pain.
Putting an animal "down"- how is this not a direct duty to the animal itself? How does the human stand to gain by this action? Don't we even commonly describe it as "putting the animal out of its misery" which interestingly brings up the notion that animals do suffer and feel pain.
Sunday, September 25, 2011
On Thomas Aquinas
This excerpt from The Summa Contra Gentiles by Thomas Aquinas, or Saint Thomas Aquinas, is good continuation of what we have been reading by Aristotle, Bacon, and good ole Descartes. Aquinas' argument seems to be that humans are intellectual, free creatures with rationality and that all other things are "subject to slavery.". Why? Because humans are the only things capable of "knowing and loving Him" meaning God, who is "the last end of the universe." (Here, I'd like to remind you guys about Aristotle's fourth cause, that the end is the object for the sake of which a thing moves.) And that humans are the only "free" creatures that act on their own accord, and are "incorruptible ...moreover, unchangeable, except in their choice." Therefore, humans are the closest beings to God and everything else is provided for human use by a Divine power for 1. Perfection of intellect 2. execution of its power and development of its knowledge and 3. Sustaining the body that is united to an intellectual soul.
Now, my favorite part if Aquinas is his statement that "divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature." I feel like the implications to this could lead to human slavery or something ...oh wait. Also, Aquinas' theory that there is "no wrong" in killing or doing anything to "dumb animals" doesn't fit well with me. Though, I can understand the train of reason if one wants to say that yes, there is a divine God that has placed the world and its resources here for human use. However, if not, then what? Are we still intellectual, free creatures? Do we still have an intelligent soul that strives towards a telos? Because if there is no longer a God there is no longer an unchanging end?
I feel that if we want to say no, Aquinas was wrong, then we can say that animals are more than "for the sake of intelligent creatures" but then we must also say that we are not intellectual, free creatures. But there might be nothing wrong with saying that we are not if it brings about better treatment of animals (including other people) and the planet as a whole. I wonder if we just hate to admit that the best way to live with the surrounding nature is to "downgrade" to being just another higher primate.
Can't wait to hear from you guys!
Now, my favorite part if Aquinas is his statement that "divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature." I feel like the implications to this could lead to human slavery or something ...oh wait. Also, Aquinas' theory that there is "no wrong" in killing or doing anything to "dumb animals" doesn't fit well with me. Though, I can understand the train of reason if one wants to say that yes, there is a divine God that has placed the world and its resources here for human use. However, if not, then what? Are we still intellectual, free creatures? Do we still have an intelligent soul that strives towards a telos? Because if there is no longer a God there is no longer an unchanging end?
I feel that if we want to say no, Aquinas was wrong, then we can say that animals are more than "for the sake of intelligent creatures" but then we must also say that we are not intellectual, free creatures. But there might be nothing wrong with saying that we are not if it brings about better treatment of animals (including other people) and the planet as a whole. I wonder if we just hate to admit that the best way to live with the surrounding nature is to "downgrade" to being just another higher primate.
Can't wait to hear from you guys!
Saturday, September 24, 2011
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